PATRICIA GRANT, wife of/and richard grant, et al., Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated

NO.:  2008-11536

DIVISION:  “H”

22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY

STATE OF LOUISIANA

Versus

SUN CONSTRUCTION, L.L.C.,
PENN MILL LAKES, L.L.C., and COOPER ENGINEERING, INC., A PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERING CORPORATION

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:

 

I.
NATURE OF THE MOTION BEFORE THE COURT

Plaintiffs, PATRICIA AND RICHARD GRANT, et al, are all homeowners in the Penn Mill Lakes Subdivision, located completely within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. This is a request, pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 592, to certify this as a class action under LSA-C.C.P. art. 591, et seq.

This class action arises out of serious drainage issues in the Penn Mill Lakes Subdivision, which affect the entire subdivision and all of the homeowners therein. The class in this action is defined by the original petition very simply as follows:

33.

The class is defined as those individuals who are homeowners in the Penn Mill Lakes Subdivision in St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana.

The class includes the class representatives named hereinabove, who filed the original petition herein. The said class also includes an unknown number of additional persons who own homes in the subdivision. The total number of the class exceeds several hundred, assuming one to two homeowners per lot/home owned.

II.
PERTINENT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The original petition was filed on March 20, 2008, by MR. AND MRS. RICHARD GRANT, ET AL., all individually and all also on behalf of the class of persons to be herein certified. This motion is therefore timely under LSA-C.C.P. art. 592, as it is being filed within ninety (90) days of that original filing date.

Written discovery in the form of interrogatories, requests for admissions and requests for production were served on each and every defendant along with the original petition. One of the purposes of this discovery is to ascertain with certainty the total number of the class and to further demonstrate the appropriateness of the action for class certification. Service of process (and service of the discovery requests) was made on all the defendants on the same day, April 3, 2008.

All of the defendants asked the plaintiffs for thirty (30) day extensions of time to respond to the petition, which requests were all granted by the plaintiffs. Defendant Sun Construction subsequently filed an exception to the petition. No other responses to the petition nor to the discovery requests have been made by the defendants as of the date of the filing of this class certification motion.

III.
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE CLASS CERTIFICATION
MOTION

Defendants designed and built a new subdivision called Penn Mill Lakes Subdivision. Penn Mill Lakes, LLC, and Sunrise Construction & Development, LLC, were the developers of the subdivision. Penn Mill was the original owner of all of the lots and common areas and is presently the sole member/owner of the homeowner’s association for the subdivision. Sun Construction, LLC, was the general contractor/builder on the construction of the subdivision. Cooper Engineering, Inc. designed the Drainage, Paving, Sewer and Water Profile and Detail Plans for Penn Mill Lakes Subdivision, St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana, which it completed and filed in the official records of the Clerk of Court.

There is a common drainage system utilized throughout the subdivision, which incorporates the use of swales, catch basins, drainage pipes, drainage lines, culverts, drainage ditches, sewers, and retention ponds. Large portions of the drainage system, including the retention ponds, ditches/swales, culverts, catch basins, and other offsite improvements are common areas and are under the exclusive control of Penn Mill.

The drainage system throughout the subdivision is defective in its design, construction, and installation. Inadequacies and defects in the design, construction, and installation of drainage system components include the following illustrative list, which was alleged in its entirety in the original petition:

a.  The drainage system is improperly graded and improperly designed so that water does not drain at a fast enough rate from the subdivision to prevent foreseeable flooding;

b.  Many of the drainage pipes and drain lines were not properly installed and were not properly fitted together and sealed, so that there are leaks in various lines;

c.  The water retention ponds were improperly designed and placed at points in the subdivision which resulted in inadequate drainage;

d.  The drainage ditches were improperly designed and improperly constructed, so that water does not drain properly;

e.  Some drainage ditches are essentially nonexistent, being little more than a two-inch wide by one-inch deep trench, so that water does not drain properly through them;

f.   The drainage system improperly incorporates many of the plaintiffs’ driveways, and the water flow and/or standing water blocks ingress and egress from many of the subdivision properties;

g.  Culverts were improperly installed and/or were omitted in many places where culverts were necessary for proper drainage;

h.  The catch basins which capture and divert surface waters into the retention ponds are improperly placed and/or insufficient in number to keep the driveway aprons from flooding or holding water impeding the sole access in and out of the residences;

i.   The sewers were improperly designed and installed and do not allow for the free flow of water causing periodic unsanitary backups;

j.   The drainage for homes that were constructed in later phases is even more inadequate than that of the earlier phases and has aggravated an already overburdened system;

k.  Some of the streets, e.g., Lakeview Drive, were not properly graded or elevated such that they are easily flooded which denies access to the residences along said streets.

Plaintiffs brought this suit to force compliance by the defendants with their duties to remedy these known problems and to bring the subdivision’s drainage system—including the common area portions of the drainage system—into compliance with standard engineering and construction practices, as well as the St. Tammany Code of Ordinances. The plaintiffs also seek damages for the alleged fraudulent actions of the defendants, as well as breaches of warranties, and actual damages. Given the nature of the claims asserted, the action was brought as a class action.  There are currently ten (10) named plaintiffs representing hundreds of class members, all of whom live or own land in Penn Mill Lakes Subdivision.

IV.
LEGAL STANDARDS OF CONSIDERATION

LSA-C.C.P. art 591 establishes a two-level analysis for determining whether to certify a class action. The first level of analysis is governed by Subsection (A), which allows a class action against one or more members of a class, who act as representative plaintiffs or defendants, only if all of the following five specific requirements are met:

1.       The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

2.       There are questions of law or fact common to the class.

3.       The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.

4.       The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect interests of the class.

5.       The class is or may be defined objectively in terms of ascertainable criteria, such that the court may determine the constituency of the class for purposes of the conclusiveness of any judgment that may be rendered in the case.

The second level of analysis for determining whether to certify a class action is governed by Subsection (B). A court reaches this level of analysis only if all of the requirements for qualifying as a class set out by Subsection (A) have been met. Once a court determines that a class action is appropriate under Subsection (A), he must also determine whether one of the requirements of Subsection (B) is also applicable. Thus, Subsection (B) further qualifies the right to file class actions by setting up alternative additional requirements for maintaining a class action. Even if all of the prerequisites for maintaining class actions listed in LSA-C.C.P. art 591(A) are present, a class action may not be maintained unless one or more of the following is also found:

1.       The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk either of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or if adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.

2.       The party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.

3.       The court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.

4.       The parties to a settlement request certification under Subparagraph B(3) for purposes of settlement, even though the requirements of Subparagraph B(3) might not otherwise be met.

Moreover, Subsection (B)(3) establishes the following criteria for determining whether common questions of law or fact predominate over questions which affect only individual members, making a class action superior over other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy:

1.       The interest of the members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions.

2.       The extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class.

3.       The desirability or undesirability of concentrating litigation in the particular forum.

4.       The difficulties likely to be encountered in management of the class action.

5.       The practical ability of individual class members to pursue their claims without class certification.

6.       The extent to which the relief plausibly demanded on behalf of or against the class, including the vindication of such public policies or legal rights as may be implicated, justifies the costs and burdens of class litigation.

Finally, LSA-C.C.P. art 591(C) provides that certification of a class may not be used to adjudicate claims or defenses which depend on proof which is individual to a single member of the class. Courts are nevertheless allowed to retain jurisdiction over those individual claims and defenses following certification.

Louisiana’s class action procedure is less rigid than the federal procedure and requires essentially only that nominate class representatives must fairly insure the adequate representation of the class. This was explained by the First Circuit Court of Appeal as follows in the oft-cited case of Livingston Parish Police Jury v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co.:[1]

The Louisiana law formulating the class action procedure is not as explicit or inflexible as the federal rules. Our law provides rather simple, basic requisites, prescribing only that one or more members of a class, who will fairly insure the adequate representation of all members, may sue in a class action on behalf of all such members. Such an action may be instituted when the persons constituting the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable for all of them to be parties thereto, and the character of the right is common to all class members. The Louisiana approach to the class action procedure differs from the federal, which statutorily treats due process and adjective matters, in that such matters are dealt with as the need arises and in the manner expedient to the exigencies of the case at hand. The result of this jurisprudential approach has been an evolutionary case-by-case development wherein guidelines have been suggested without the imposition of a concretized procedure.

V.
APPLICABILITY OF THE LEGAL STANDARDS TO THIS CLASS

The purpose of a class action is to allow a small number of persons to sue on behalf of all members of the class. Verdin v. Thomas.[2]  Here, the nominate class representatives named herein as plaintiffs/class representatives have brought suit on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated within the Penn Mill Lakes Subdivision. The very nature of this case is such that class adjudication is certainly the most appropriate (perhaps the only possible) means of litigation. The case concerns drainage issues that are common to the entire subdivision. The problems arise on numerous properties and common areas throughout the subdivision and they should only be addressed in one case at one time in one forum.

Under the requirements of LSA-C.C.P. art. 591, et seq., this matter is properly brought before this Honorable Court as a class action and the plaintiffs therefore submit that, for the following reasons, the class should be certified:

A. The requirements of LSA-C.C.P. art 591(A) are met.

1. Numerosity. The first prerequisite for maintaining a class action established by article Subsection (A)(1) is that the members of the class be so numerous that joinder is impracticable; sometimes called the “numerosity requirement.”[3] Although the party seeking certification is not required to identify all potential class members, he should be able to establish a “definable group of aggrieved persons.”[4]

While the class in this case is easily and simply defined as, “Those individuals who are homeowners in the Penn Mill Lakes Subdivision in St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana,” that simply-defined class easily numbers in the hundreds (assuming only one to two landowners per lot or home), so that joinder of all class members is certainly impracticable. Little more need be said about the numerosity of this class.

2. Commonality. The second prerequisite for maintaining a class action, established by Subsection (A)(2), is the existence of questions of law or fact common to the class.  The Louisiana Practice Series states of this requirement: [5]

This requirement was recognized by the pre-1997 amendment jurisprudence, but was generally combined with numerous other factors into the “common character” requirement, which was done away with. Because the factors traditionally used to determine the “common character” requirement are now listed in 591(B) as alternative additional requirements for maintaining a class action, the second prerequisite for maintaining a class action—a question of fact or law common to the class—is presumably very straightforward under the new law. No cases have interpreted the new law, but a showing that all members of the class are affected by a common question of fact or law is obviously sufficient.

There are certainly questions of law or fact common to the class in this case, including the questions of law and fact related to the above-cited injunctive relief, which the plaintiffs herein seek on behalf of the class. The nature of the claims themselves, including the fact that much of the drainage system exists on common areas, show that commonality is certainly present.

3. Typicality. The third requirement under Subsection (A)(3) is that the claims or defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class. In this case, the defendants’ common course of action, repeated and continued fraudulent statements and actions vis-ŕ-vis the class members, and defective design, construction, and installation of the drainage system were all committed on the class members as a whole and/or were repeated nearly identically towards each class member.  From just a cursory review of the individual stories told by the class representatives and by all of the other class members and as will be shown by testimony at the certification hearing, it is clear that these representatives’ claims are quite typical of all the claims of all the landowners in the subdivision.

4. Adequacy. The adequate representation requirement of Subsection (A)(4) is based on the theory that a class representative who has a personal interest in the result of the litigation will be likely to undertake a full prosecution or defense.[6]  The requirement guarantees that the representative will adequately protect the interests of the absent class members.[7] In this case, the representative parties are highly motivated and exceedingly organized as a group.  They have retained multiple attorneys who are all well versed in the law to assist them and they will all fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

5. Objective, Ascertainable Criteria. The fifth prerequisite for maintaining a class action established by Subsection (A)(5) is that the class must be capable of objective definition by ascertainable criteria, so that the court will be able to determine the constituency of the class in order to make any judgment rendered in the case conclusive.

Generally, a trial court should not deny a class action on the grounds that identification of all the members of the class would be difficult.[8] That principle was explained as follows by the Louisiana Supreme Court in the McCastle case:[9]

It is not essential that every member of the class be identified before a class action can be certified. Difficulty in identifying the claimants is one of the factors which makes joinder impracticable and a class action appropriate. To prevent a class action on the grounds that every member of the class cannot be identified would bar the class action where it is usually needed most. Therefore, as long as the class itself is reasonably identified, it is not necessary that all the members of the class be identified at the commencement of the action.

The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal allowed a class action despite the fact that the named plaintiff did not have access to the names or identities of the other members of the class, which were in defendant's sole possession.[10] Once the plaintiff had established a “prima facie case for class certification,” he was entitled to discover the names and identities of other potential members of the class in order to provide notification, the court said.[11] While the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals has taken a more restrictive view of this criteria, the First Circuit has held that classes should be confirmed when the class has, as this class clearly does, established “geographic boundaries.”[12]

As is apparent from the concise and concrete definition of the class in this case, defined by the plaintiffs simply as “landowners in the Penn Mill Lakes Subdivision,” this class clearly has those clear “geographic boundaries” and is clearly capable of objective definition by ascertainable criteria.  

Lastly, before leaving this last criteria, it is well worth noting that the plaintiffs have already sent discovery requests to all defendants asking them to turn over documents currently in their possession which would enable the discovery of the precise names and addresses of each and every class member.  As of the date of the filing of this motion, those discovery requests have not been answered by the defendants.

B. The requirements of LSA-C.C.P. art. 591(B) are also met.

The second level of analysis for determining whether to certify a class action is governed by LSA-C.C.P. art 591(B). Once a court determines that a class action is appropriate under Subsection (A), it must also be determined whether any one of the requirements of Subsection (B) is also applicable. Therefore, pursuant to 591(B), a class action may not be maintained unless one or more of the following is also true:

 (1)  The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk either of (a) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or (b) if adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.

LSA-C.C.P. art. 591(B)(1) establishes the first alternative additional requirement for maintenance of a class action. This provision allows a class action in the event the class meets all the prerequisites of article Subsection (A), if the prosecution of separate actions by or against the individual members of the class would create either of two risks. First, a class action is appropriate, under provisions of Subsection (B)(1)(a), if suits by individual members of the class might result in inconsistent or varying decisions concerning the claims of individual members of the class that would cause confusion concerning the standards of conduct required of the party opposing the class because the standards established by the different cases might not be compatible with one another. Second, a class action is appropriate, under the provisions of Subsection (B)(1)(b), if suits by individual members of the class might result in decisions that would, as a practical matter, dispose of interests of other members of the class who are not parties to the individual actions or if decisions in the individual cases might impair or impede the ability of other members of the class to protect their own interests.

In this case, the suit seeks to compel the defendants to answer for and repair the defective drainage system in the entire subdivision, including many component parts of which are present on land belonging to the class members and on land owned in common, such as the lakes and retention ponds. If individual suits were filed on these issues, the confusion to the parties as to their rights and obligations would be immense and the threat of inconsistency of judgments would certainly be high.

(2)  The party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.

The second alternative additional requirement for maintenance of a class action is established by 591(B)(2), which allows a class action in the event the class meets all the prerequisites 591(A), based on the improper actions or inactions of the party(ies) opposing the class. If the opposing party has “acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole appropriate, the class action may be maintained.”[13] This factor has no counterpoint in the pre-amendment jurisprudence interpreting class actions.[14]

As stated above, the defendants continued actions in (1) continuing to develop future phases of the subdivision (while still using the same flawed design) and (2) refusing to adequately address the existing known problems in the drainage systems, have necessitated the seeking of declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the entire class. This is precisely the type of case which was envisioned by this Subsection.

(3)  The court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.

Pursuant to art. 591(B)(3), a class action is appropriate in the event that the class meets all the prerequisites of 591(A), along with the presence of two additional factors: (1) that the common questions of law or fact affecting all the members of the class “predominate over any question affecting only individual members,” and (2) that deciding the controversy in a class action would be superior to other available methods of deciding the controversy because it would result in a more fair, efficient adjudication.

As for the first of those two factors, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that “the mere fact that varying degrees of damages may result from the same factual transaction and the same legal relationship, or that class members must individually prove their right to recover, does not preclude class certification.”[15]

The 1997 amendment to Article 591 lists in Subsection (B)(3) the six specific “matters” which have been legislatively declared “pertinent to the findings” of: (1) whether the common questions of fact and law affecting all members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the class, and (2) whether a class action is a superior procedural vehicle over other available methods for fairly and efficiently deciding the controversy.  Those six “matters” are as follows:

1. "The interest of the members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions."

2. "The extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class."

3. "The desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation in the particular forum."

4. "The difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of the class action."

5. "The practical ability of individual class members to pursue their claims without class certification."

6. "The extent to which the relief plausibly demanded on behalf of or against the class, including vindication of such public policies or legal rights as may be implicated, justifies the costs and burdens of class litigation."

The interest of each member of the class in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions is relatively low. While there would certainly be interest from each class member to seek remedies at law for these drainage issues, the nature of this litigation (even if brought as individual suits) is such that it will likely be very time consuming, difficult, and expensive. Any individual suit relating to all of these subdivision-wide drainage issues would likely garner a net loss of money for an individual plaintiff, due to the expense and complexity of the litigation.  Therefore, interest for an individual to pursue these issues on a systemic and subdivision-wide basis would, in the end, likely be nil. 

As to the extent and nature of any litigation already commenced, there has been no other class action filed concerning this matter and, to the plaintiffs’ knowledge, only two other lawsuits which raises these types of issues. Those other suits were brought by individuals in this Court for issues surrounding those plaintiffs’ homes, as well as drainage issues existing on those homeowners’ individual lots. And, while those plaintiffs may be able to obtain a net gain by pursuing relief for specific problems with their lots, their suit only evidences the need for a single class in one forum, whereby all issues for all lots and all common areas can receive appropriate relief, while promoting judicial efficiency. These issues should be addressed on a systemic level for all lots and all common areas in one suit, not piecemeal in repeated individual litigation.[16]

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this matter should be certified as a class action, the class defined as proposed by the plaintiffs, the named plaintiffs appointed as the representatives of the class, and undersigned counsel appointed as class counsel.

 

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED BY:

 

LE GARDEUR, LTD.

 

_____________________________________

Maurice Le Gardeur (#8274)

222 N. Massachusetts Street     

Covington, LA 70433

Phone: (985) 892-1420

Fax: (985) 892-1797

Co-Counsel for the plaintiffs

 

AND:

 

______________________________________

ADAM S. LAMBERT (#25134)

517 Huntlee Drive

New Orleans, LA 70131-5221

Tel.: (504) 433-0289

Fax: (504) 433-0840

Email: LSULawyer@aol.com

URL: http://www.Lambert-Law.com

Co-Counsel for the plaintiffs

 

AND:

 

 

KOERNER LAW FIRM

 

By: ________________________________

Louis R. Koerner, Jr.

Louisiana Bar 7817

400 Lafayette Street

P.O. Box 4297

Houma, Louisiana 70361

Telephone: 985-580-0350

Telecopier: 985-580-0980

Cellular: 985-232-7547

New Orleans: 504-581-9569

Lafayette: 337-289-9225

e-mail: koerner@koerner-law.com

URL: http://www.koerner-law.com

Co-Counsel for the plaintiffs

 

AND:

 

________________________________

EMERY NORTON VOORHIES (#13124)

616 East Boston Street

Covington, Louisiana 70433

Telephone: (985) 898-0940

Facsimile: (985) 893-2184

Co-counsel for plaintiffs

 

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing pleading has been served upon all interested counsel, by FAX, by email, by hand delivery, or by placing copy of same into the First Class mail, postage prepaid and properly addressed, on this the ________ day of ___________________, 2008

 

____________________________

Maurice LeGardeur

 

 

 



[1] 432 So. 2d 1027 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983), writ denied, 437 So. 2d 1137 (La. 1983).

[2] 191 So. 2d 646 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966).

[3] Becnel v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 613 So. 2d 1155, 1157 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1993).

[4] Mayho v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 750 So. 2d 278 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1999), writ denied, 756 So. 2d 1143 (La. 2000).

[5] LAPRAC-CP ART 591 (bold emphasis added).

[6] Rapp v. Iberia Parish School Board, 926 So. 2d 30 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006).

[7] Id.

[8] McCastle v. Rollins Environmental Services of Louisiana, Inc., 456 So. 2d 612 (La. 1984); Ellis v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 550 So. 2d 1310 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1989), writ denied, 559 So. 2d 121 (La. 1990).

[9] 456 So. 2d at 620 (citations omitted).

[10] See Apolinar v. Professional Const. Services, Inc., 694 So. 2d 537 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1997), rev'd without opinion, 701 So. 2d 964 (La. 1997).

[11] 694 So.2d at 543.

[12] See, e.g., Cotton v. Gaylord Container, 691 So. 2d 760 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1997), writ denied, 693 So. 2d 147 (La. 1997)

[13] LAPRAC-CP ART 591.

[14] Id.

[15] Bartlett v. Browning-Ferris Industries Chemical Services, Inc., 759 So. 2d 755 (La. 1999).

[16] The last factor set forth in 591(B)(4), relating to settlement classes, does not apply here.